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Abstract
Computing systems comprise a surreptitious and intrinsic part of our daily life activities. Applications that support
humans in daily life facilitate the development of the so-called Intelligent Environments. Like any technology
Intelligent Environments can fail. This paper examines potential negative consequences of such systems if they are
too naively or optimistically developed and used. The aim of this work is to encourage those contributing to the
technical area to reflect on these issues and to provide symbiotic solutions which make such a powerful technical
development safer for humans so that it can unfold all its potential to empower future citizens, especially the
vulnerable.
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1. Introduction
Building computing systems that operate safely in the real
world is very difficult. Compounded by commercial pres-
sure unreliable systems are sometimes expedited and
deployed in the marketplace. Even with the best inten-
tions and state-of-the-art resources it is almost unavoid-
able that systems contain weaknesses that will lead to
failure; evidence has demonstrated that it is not a matter
of ‘if’ but ‘when’.
Intelligent Environment systems [1, 2] are inherently
complex, because of the need for a symbiotic interaction
of hardware, software, human processes. Here we use the
term Intelligent Environment to refer as a whole to the
infrastructure (Smart Environments [3]) and the software
that governs their behaviour (Ambient Intelligence [4]).
By their very definition, ‘. . . digital environments that
proactively, but sensibly, support people in their daily
lives’. [5], these systems are conceived to be deployed
in the real world to support humans in a variety of super-
visory contexts. Some examples of such systems are
‘smart’ homes, classrooms, cars, offices, manufacturing
plants, etc. In some of those applications the artificial
system is given an enormous responsibility (e.g. related
to safety or well-being).
The magnitude of practical problems to be solved has
often concentrated designers’ efforts on what to do to
get these systems working. Little or no attention is paid
to what happens when systems do not behave as antici-
pated. Nobody wants to announce that their system at
some point will fail to deliver as expected, but it is an
unavoidable circumstance that will eventually happen.
Power cuts occur, sensors sometimes malfunction, sen-
sors can be displaced and hence the quality of the input
to the software taking decisions is degraded. Software
can contain bugs, software and hardware updates can
introduce errors, or rare, unanticipated and potentially
unsafe scenarios can occur. Interoperability issues in com-
plex computing and communication environments can
lead to unintended consequences. As humans start to
experience and benefit from the first successful Ambient
Intelligence (AmI) systems supporting their daily activi-
ties, it may be unavoidable that the human (traditional)
circle of care (family, friends, healthcare professionals)
relaxes, invests trust in the system and may not be there
when the artificial system fails.*Corresponding author. Email: jc.augusto@ulster.ac.uk
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Consider the requirement of the role of AmI in smart
homes [6], in particular providing care for vulnerable peo-
ple [7]. In the UK for the first time there are more people
over the age of 65 years than are under the age of 18 years.
More elders have care and support needs, which highlight
the need for an affordable system. In England in 2010
£80mwas invested in technologies to support preventative
care and assist older people to remain in their own homes.
In 2011, the Scottish government also has invested signif-
icantly in home care. It will spend £10m on a 4-year
scheme designed to deploy telehealth systems, which aid
treatment of health conditions within patients’ homes.
The Scottish Assisted Living Demonstrator programme
will involve about 10000 people, both the elderly and
those with disabilities1. This is in spite of a lack of agree-
ment for the cost-effectiveness of such an intervention
[8]. However, Gaikwad andWarren [9] demonstrated that
home-based interventions applied to chronic disease man-
agement improved functional and cognitive patient out-
comes and reduced healthcare spending.
Local authorities work with partners in housing, health,
voluntary and independent sectors, and with service users
and carers, to implement a telecare-based approach.
However, technology-based intervention should not be
seen as a substitute for meaningful human interactions
and interventions, but as a means of enhancing them. Fisk
[10] points out that technology is a tool and on its own is
neither empowering nor disabling.
Researchers involved in the development of Intelligent
Environments have a responsibility to start the discussion
on how to design holistically safer systems. Systems (in
the broader sense, i.e. the combination of hardware, soft-
ware, humans and procedures being introduced) should
have a responsible attitude towards the environment they
serve when they cannot deliver appropriately, and disclose
such information in a timely fashion. The AmI community
cannot adopt the concept of an ‘accident waiting to hap-
pen’. A thread of discussion should be opened within our
community on the different ways this can be achieved.
However, we begin this debate from a far from perfect
human-centric baseline. In the US it has been estimated
that up to 98000 people currently die in hospitals each
year as a result of preventable medical errors. This exceeds
deaths caused by motor-vehicle accidents, breast cancer
and AIDS. It is not acceptable for patients to be harmed
by the healthcare system whose overarching goal is, ‘First,
do no harm’. [11]. In the UK approximately 20000–
30000 people die as a result of medical errors every year,
according to Dr Richard Smith, editor of the British
Medical Journal2. A rethink of healthcare systems is
required to cut the number of mistakes made by medical
personnel [12] to the low levels of errors among other
safety critical industries such as pilots or nuclear plant
workers. According to the chief medical officer, Sir Liam
Donaldson, clinical misjudgements or mistakes mean that
the odds of dying as a result of being treated in hospital
are 33000 times higher than those of dying in an air crash
[13]. ‘In an airline industry, the evidence . . . from sched-
uled airlines is the risk of death is one in 10 million. If you
go into a hospital in the developed world, the risk of
death from a medical error is one in 300’, he said.
Home healthcare is not without risk, of course. Roback
and Herzog [14] considered risks that are encountered
when placing electronic equipment in this environment.
They found that adverse events could stem from technol-
ogy itself, from human–technology interaction or from
the environment in which the technology is placed.
Guidelines aimed at performance improvement comple-
ment the more general guidelines on tele-homecare
adopted by the American Telemedicine Association. Con-
cerns on the safe development and deployment of these
technologies were also clearly raised in [15].
Thus a major new question arises: Will AmI systems
make this form of care safer or potentially dangerous?
2. The argument
This section explains why systems can and will most prob-
ably fail at some point and exposes the potential negative
consequences for the people these systems are supposed
to help.
2.1. Hypothesis 1: ‘Computing systems DO fail!’
As software practitioners and consumers, we all experi-
ence minor faults on a daily basis, due to faulty or poorly
developed software. However, the history of Software
Engineering is plagued with examples of catastrophic fail-
ure made by organizations that have exceptional resources
and powerful development teams. For example:
d A Computer-Aided Despatch system for London’s
Ambulance Service was introduced in 1992. It han-
dled approximately 5000 patients, with over a thou-
sand ‘999’ emergency calls per day. If the position of
vehicles was incorrectly recorded, multiple vehicles
were sent to the same location; it has been claimed
that the occurrence of such an error leads to the
death of between 20 and 30 people.
d Intel Pentium processor, released in 1994, was
designed to be three times faster for floating point
computation than the 486DX chip.However, an error
in the lookup table resulted in a component, whichwas
not fit for the purpose. For example, the calculation of
ratio 4195835/3145727 yielded 1.3337 and not
1.3338, an error in the 5th significant digit.
1www.guardian.co.uk/healthcare-network/2011/mar/16/
scotland-spends-10m-transfer-telehealth-techology (accessed
September 2011).
2http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/682000.stm (accessed
September 2011).
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d The Ariane 5 rocket, ESA (European Space Agency)
was launched on 4 June 1996. Thirty-seven seconds
later it self-destructed. An uncaught exception:
numerical overflow in a conversion routine resulted
in incorrect altitude computed by the on-board
computer.
d The Mars Polar Lander was launched 3 January 1999
and lost 3 December 1999. Engine shutdown due to
spurious signals gave false indication that spacecraft
had landed. Subsequently NASA’s Mars Rover
freezes (21 January 2004) due to too many open files
in flash memory.
d The BMW 3 Series, with 100s of embedded compo-
nents, was extensively tested but in 1999 a safety recall
of over 16000 cars was required due to faults with air-
bag control unit—in certain conditions the airbag
inflated for no reason. More recently Toyota was
forced to recall 180000 vehicles in the UK, due to a
failure of the controlled servo braking mechanism.
Toyota reported that its biggest-ever safety scare cost
the company $2bn worldwide. Honda and Renault
also issued recalls recently due to software failures.
The list, of course, is not exhaustive. An open approach
where legitimate safety concerns can be raised is required.
There is evidence that this is beginning to happen [16] in
the health system, allowing safety concerns to be raised by
humans. AmI systems require a similar culture of
transparency.
2.2. Hypothesis 2: ‘The more complex the system
the more prone to failure’
Modern computer systems are built as a complex inter-
connection of specialized modules (Figure 1). As systems
become more complex, the potential for failure increases
[17]. Therefore Software Engineering has provided
important methods and tools in an attempt to increase
the reliability in software and computing systems. These
include testing, verification and validation as steps that
can help developers and users ensure that the right system
has been built in the right way. The reader can find a
good summary on these approaches in [18, 19]. Even
when big companies have specialized teams this is still
insufficient to provide ‘bullet proof’ systems.
The impact of complexity on reliability can be recog-
nized in all fields. For example, Richard Cook [20] cites
18 reasons why complexity in the medical system can lead
to failure. He discusses: ‘How failure is evaluated; how
failure is attributed to proximate cause; and the resulting
new understanding of patient safety’.
A complex systemof relevance is TheUK’sNational Pro-
gramme for Information Technology, described as ‘The
Biggest Computer Programme in the World . . . Ever!’.
Brennan [21] points out that ‘apart from the spine, the cen-
tral repository of electronic health records, there is no single
deadline or point of failure, just thousands of local implemen-
tations of systems of a type that we really should have got the
hang of by now’. An audit by theHouse ofCommons Public
Accounts Committee (14 January 2009) concluded [22]:
‘Some systems are being deployed across the NHS. The Care
Records Service, however, is at least four years behind schedule,
with the Department’s latest forecasts putting completion at
2014–15. At 31 August 2008, new care records systems had
been deployed in 133 of the 380 Trusts’. . . . ‘The estimated cost
of the Programme is £12.7 billion, including £3.6 billion of
local costs, although this figure remains uncertain’. By 18
July 2011, a further report from Public Accounts Commit-
tee recommended that the DoH consider scrapping the
project altogether, rather than continuewith the remaining
multi-billion pound investment. ‘The [DoH] should
review whether to continue the programme and consider
whether the remaining £4.3bn would be better spent else-
where’. The complexity of systems that work well in isola-
tion caused delay and uncertainty. The interaction and
acceptance of new systems with the people intended to
use them was also underestimated.
2.3. Hypothesis 3: Intelligent Environment systems
are inherently complex
Intelligent Environments can be developed in any envi-
ronment where technology can be deployed to assist
humans. That infrastructure is supported by a so-called
Ambient Intelligence that relates software specifically
designed to make decisions based on a sensed reality to
the technical infrastructure. This creates a complex inter-
dependence and a reliance on several well-established
areas (Figure 2). For example, the system needs sensors
to gather information from the monitored environment
and actuators to intervene upon that environment. These
sensors are interconnected through a (wired or wireless)
network that provides information flows. For an environ-
ment to be useful to humans as they move along different
Figure 1. Modern computing systems are constructed as a set
of autonomous modules that can interact with each other in
various sophisticated ways.
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areas in their daily living routines, services have to be
ubiquitous, i.e. be accessible everywhere and provide
services transparently and according to the place and cir-
cumstance. These systems require sophisticated algo-
rithms which can adapt to the user and provide
appropriate interventions consistent with the user needs
and preferences. For a system of this type to be successful
it has to provide a subtle interaction with the user so that
all the complexity is hidden within the system and the
users enjoy the benefits with minimal effort, thanks to a
natural interaction (e.g. everyday natural language).
Sensors and actuators can sometimes be occluded,
transmit noisy signals or be moved (intentionally or by
accident). Networks can sometimes be unreliable and
are vulnerable to changes in the infrastructure and to
security attacks. Ubiquitous systems can be altered
according to changes in the infrastructure or in the tasks
the user performs in different places. Artificial Intelligence
software can sometimes fail to provide an acceptable
answer to some of the difficult problems that it faces. Dif-
ferent users interact differently with machines due to cul-
tural, physical or intellectual differences, therefore there is
no ‘size that fit all’ and it is also very difficult to have very
flexible and human-level intelligent interfaces.
2.4. Hypothesis 4: AmI systems support people.
Some of this support is critical (there is
a potential for human harm or life loss
if the AmI system fails)
We can potentially consider a wide range of Intelligent
Environments. Some that have been started to be
explored are: Smart Homes, Smart Classrooms, Smart
Cars, health-related applications in hospitals, public trans-
portation in cities, emergency services, industry, decision
support for business and public surveillance. Let us exem-
plify this step with the first three as exemplars.
Smart Homes. A prominent example of an environment
enriched with AmI is a Smart Home; that is a house
equipped to bring advanced services to its users. Examples
of such technology include movement sensors (Passive
Infrared detectors), pull chord switch, thermostat, smoke
detector, doorbell indicator, pressure pads, on-off switch
detectors, phone and medical devices (e.g. blood pressure
monitor, heart monitor, etc.). Examples of enriched
devices are electro-domestics (e.g. cooker and refrigera-
tor), household items (e.g. taps, bed and sofa) and tem-
perature handling devices (e.g. air conditioning and
radiators). Expected benefits of the application of this
technology can be: (a) increased safety (e.g. by monitor-
ing lifestyle patterns or the latest activities and providing
assistance when a potentially harmful situation is develop-
ing), (b) enhanced comfort (e.g. by adjusting tempera-
ture automatically) and (c) better economy (e.g.
controlling the use of lights). There is a plethora of sens-
ing/acting technology: stand-alone devices (e.g. smoke
or movement detectors), sensors embedded in household
objects (e.g. a microwave controller or a bed occupancy
sensor) and body-worn devices (e.g. shirts manufactured
with electrodes that monitor heart beat, and potentially
unsafe conditions). Figure 3(a) illustrates a plan of a
house with a typical distribution of sensors.
Recent applications include the use of Smart Homes to
provide a safe environment where people with special
needs can enjoy a better quality of life. For example, in
the case of people at early stages of dementia (the most
frequent case being elderly people suffering from
Alzheimer’s disease) the system can be tailored to mini-
Figure 2. AmI is a multidisciplinary area, each of them highly
complex in itself.
Figure 3. Intelligent Environments, from left to right: (a) Smart Homes [23], (b) Smart Classrooms [24], (c) Smart Cars (Courtesy of
Siemens).
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mize risks and ensure appropriate care at critical times by
monitoring activities, diagnosing interesting situations
and possibly advising the carer when intervention is
required. This is a further example of AmI, whereby a
message can be generated automatically and sent to carer
(who may live remotely) by appropriate technology, such
as mobile phone or digital television; the carer’s environ-
ment of course having sensed the most appropriate
delivery channel. Failing to detect an unsafe situation
or to deliver a call for help through an appropriate chan-
nel at the right time can be critical for the person being
cared by the system.
Education services. Universities and higher education
institutions are starting to consider the concept of Smart
Classrooms [25] where technology such as smart boards,
smart sound system capable to recognize and process ver-
bal instructions, and smart cameras which can capture
images autonomously are to be shown to students attend-
ing a lecture remotely (Figure 3(b)). Twenty years ago
lecturers went to the classroom to write the content of
the lecture on a board and to explain it. Nowadays lectur-
ers deliver a lecture with the help of slides, the Internet
and simulation software. Students can actively participate
using interactive boards, and express their response to
queries by ‘‘voting’’ on an answer, hence empowering
the lecturer and student with information on whether
the knowledge has been transferred as intended, all in
near real time. If the technology fails then the lecturer will
strive to achieve the objectives of that lecture but students
may lose significant content (e.g. for those attending
remotely it may simply mean they do not have a class that
day).
Intelligent cars. Modern cars have dozens of sensors to
provide fuel efficiency, improved stability in the vehicle
(e.g. better grip at high speed or in difficult weather con-
ditions). More recently some manufacturers started to use
sensors that can assist the driver in parking the vehicle by
detecting proximity to cars at the front and back of the
parking vehicle (Figure 3(c)). These sensors are starting
to be used to prevent collisions. A more sophisticated
recent development [26] has built a system that allows
the car to ‘observe’ the driver, continuously estimating
the driver’s internal state and responding appropriately.
Observations are focused on hand and leg motions and
associated actions (e.g. passing, turning, stopping, car fol-
lowing, lane change or speeding up). This allowed the car
to recognize and warn the driver about possible dangers.
Other systems are under study that will recognize from
the facial gestures and body movements of potentially
dangerous situations, for example, the driver falling asleep
while driving. Microsoft, among others, employ AmI
technologies for driver assistance by providing route plan-
ners and customized dynamic route suggestions to bypass
congestion [27, 28]. As one of the authors of this article
painfully experienced, a damaged car can easily be the
direct result of a malfunctioning sensor during parking.
Other failures can have severe consequences (e.g. injury
or death).
Having explored the broader scope of AmI in an Intel-
ligent Environment, we will emphasize health–social care
applications like the use of Smart Homes for care of the
elderly (Ambient Assisted Living).
2.5. Hypothesis 5: The current state of the art
on developing AmI systems is not well
organized. In particular, it does not contemplate
as a standard that the system may/will fail
Marketing focuses on what an intelligent system can do
and not so much on its limitations and never on its pitfalls
(Figure 4). It is not good advertisement for a company to
highlight the potential faults systems may have. Still com-
panies should face this topic unashamedly and show gen-
uine interest on offering good and reliable service. Hence,
the concepts of ‘mean time before failure’ and ‘service
level agreement’ should be considered mandatory for
AmI components and systems.
2.6. Hypothesis 6: As humans start to experience
the first successful AmI systems supporting
their lives the human caring circle relaxes
and is not there when the artificial system fails
Current caring systems are human based and rely on pro-
fessionals from the health system, relatives and friends to
care for another human being (Figure 5(a)). Imagine the
scenario where an Ambient Assisted Living system is
deployed and it works acceptably most of the time to
the point that the human carers accept the system
and get used to it. As this happens they will feel confident
enough to be absent more often (Figure 5(b)); in
some extreme cases they may withdraw completely
(Figure 5(c)). However, people with dementia, for exam-
ple, will continue to deteriorate, often challenging the
requirements of the original system. This provides the
ethical dilemma—living without a safety net in an Intelli-
gent Environment.
Figure 4. Current state of the art highlights success while
often denying problems.
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3. Proposed solutions
The obvious and easy thing to say in these circumstances
is: ‘Systems should not be built to operate alone’, a sort of
‘bury your head in the sand’ strategy. The problem is peo-
ple do not necessarily use systems in the ideal form. If a
system has been designed to monitor whether an elderly
person may have fallen and the system does not work
properly, failing to detect or alert to such an occurrence
then regardless of the fact that other carers may or not
be available is irrelevant and does not exculpate the
responsibility of the system; it is still failing to detect or
achieve its main objective.
We have already experienced examples from other
areas. McLaren recalled baby push chairs in the US during
2009 as some children had their fingers injured in the
folding mechanism. McLaren could have claimed that it
was not an intended use or they could have applied a
warning sticker in an attempt to absolve themselves of
responsibility. This solution would not have ameliorated
the problem, reduced litigation or built a credible public
reputation. For the same reasons car manufacturers
(Toyota, Honda and Renault) recalled cars during 2010
because of the suspicion of faulty mechanisms.
There is a need for the community developing Intelli-
gent Environments to adopt a more mature approach to
the problem than simply passing the responsibility of
problems to the final user. Below there are some sugges-
tions which may be helpful to initiate a much needed dis-
cussion on this topic. We recognize that this is not a
definitive solution but a starting point for further debate.
3.1. A formal software engineering approach
to AmI systems design
Software Engineering uses systematic methods to increase
reliability of software. ‘Testing’ has been used, but testing
is limited to probing a system on a few of the many pos-
sible situations that can face. Research conducted for dec-
ades has matured to produce efficient tools based on
Formal Methods which allow the automated analysis of
the behaviour of a system in a more rigorous way.
These methods and tools allow for the Verification of
Software and Hardware Systems. The most common
strategy used is Model Checking which provides tools
that development teams can use to increase the reliability
and robustness of their software system [17, 18, 29]. This
process is time consuming and therefore is mostly applied
in the development of high-integrity systems where safety
or security is important. Formal methods have been used
in industrial applications to address the following:
d Safety, which is a measure of the continuous delivery
of service free from occurrences of catastrophic
failures.
d Reliability, which is a measure of the continuous
delivery of proper service (where service is delivered
according to specified conditions) or equivalently of
the time to failure.
d Availability, which is a measure of the delivery of
proper service with respect to the alternation of
proper and improper service.
These criteria are equally relevant to AmI in healthcare.
For example, Somerville [19] provides a formal specifica-
tion to provide a state schema for an insulin pump, which
is a safety critical application. Software Engineering Meth-
ods used for verification of Intelligent Environments are
described in [23, 30, 31].
3.2. The need for enhanced understanding
of human–computer (AmI) interaction
Further ethnographic research is required to understand
how people interact with these systems and use the infor-
mation they provide, particularly with regard to safety
issues. This is required for the person being monitored,
the carer and the healthcare professional. Data may be
collected through participant observation, interviews
and questionnaires. Human–computer interaction experts
can contribute to the knowledge base. For previous work
that has highlighted the need for methods of validation
by users that combine scientific objectiveness with the
Figure 5. Potential deterioration of human circle of care.
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need of allowing the subjective opinion of the final user of
AmI systems, see [32].
3.3. A partnership between AmI and human
In a systematic review of the benefits of home telecare
for elderly people and those with long-term conditions,
James Barlow et al. [8] concluded that, the most
effective interventions appear to be automated vital signs
monitoring (for reducing health service use) and tele-
phone follow-up by nurses (for improving clinical indica-
tors and reducing health service use). There was
insufficient evidence about the effects of home safety
and security alert systems. However, Barlow concluded
that because there was insufficient evidence, this did
not mean that those interventions have no effect. How-
ever, a key point is the relationship between systems and
humans.
Hardware and software should have monitors and
reporting built-in. A system of triage may be appropri-
ate. For the most serious errors, the system should con-
clude that it could cause more harm than good and
remove the appearance of a safety net. However for
minor errors, it may be possible for the system to work
safely with reduced sensors or a faulty software process
and continue to work with a reduced capacity. This
should be clearly signalled to the users (cared for person,
carer and healthcare professional). Where a clean bill of
health is given, the system must still monitor the
occurrence of unanticipated event that could jeopardize
safety.
3.4. The ethical dimension
The British Computer Society (BCS) has drawn up seven
general principles of informatics ethics [33], which we
Table 1. Informatics ethics and AmI [33].
Ethical principles Definition (BCS) Factors relating to AmI Systems
Information privacy
and disposition
All persons have a fundamental right to privacy,
and hence to control over the collection, storage,
access, use, communication, manipulation and
disposition of data about themselves.
The cared for person, where appropriate, should
have control over the information that is collected
and made available to carers and relatives.
Otherwise, a carer should have appropriate access.
Openness The collection, storage, access, use,
communication, manipulation and disposition of
personal data must be disclosed in an appropriate
and timely fashion to the subject of those data.
The AmI system must be open (so that its decisions
can be evaluated), and the information must be made
available to the cared for person or their carer.
Security Data that have been legitimately collected about a
person should be protected by all reasonable and
appropriate measures against loss, degradation,
unauthorized destruction, access, use,
manipulation, modification or communication.
Data must be kept securely, particularly as they
may be stored for trend analysis and communicated
to remote locations.
Access The subject of an electronic record has the
right of access to that record and the right to
correct the record with respect to its
accurateness, completeness and relevance.
The data collected should be considered no
different to other information in the electronic
health record.
Legitimate infringement The fundamental right of control over the
collection, storage, access, use, manipulation,
communication and disposition of personal data is
conditioned only by the legitimate, appropriate and
relevant data needs of a free, responsible and
democratic society, and by the equal and
competing rights of other persons.
Competing rights of other persons must be
respected in AmI systems.
Least intrusive alternative Any infringement of the privacy rights of the
individual person, and of the individual’s right to
control over person-relative data as mandated
under Principle 1, may only occur in the least
intrusive fashion and with a minimum of
interference with the rights of the affected person.
The least intrusive principle applies in AmI systems.
This may have particular relevance to the recording
(and communication) of images and multimedia data
within an Intelligent Environment.
Accountability Any infringement of the privacy rights of the
individual person, and of the right to control over
person-relative data, must be justified to the
affected person in good time and in an
appropriate fashion.
AmI system must be open and accountable for any
infringement of the privacy rights of the individual
person, e.g. alerting a call centre to wandering
behaviour.
Living without a safety net in an Intelligent Environment
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believe should be tested in any AmI system. These funda-
mental principles are evaluated in Table 1 and have added
relevance where data are collected and processed by com-
plex algorithms; on vulnerable people, some of whommay
be dependent on carers or relatives. In particular, AmI
systems should also be accountable for any infringement
of the privacy rights of the individual person.
4. Conclusions
AmI researchers have a responsibility to design safer
systems, with a high level of transparency. This includes
systems that have a responsible attitude towards the
environment they serve when they cannot deliver
appropriately. Formal specification may provide a means
of designing many unsafe conditions out of software. This
is time consuming and expensive for normal software, but
is important for safety critical AmI applications, and
should not be discounted.
It is evident that the hardware and software should be
reliable in an AmI system. Thus monitoring is a require-
ment that is self-testing, periodic checking processes with
self-report of possible underperformance, e.g. due to a
faulty, misplaced sensor or sensor whose battery may need
replacement. It may be possible to provide a system which
can continue to reason under uncertainty, but this condi-
tion must be identified so that periodic human triage can
attend to maintenance issues.
We should strive to ensure that AmI used within an as-
sistive environment should improve quality of life. Hence
AmI can not only detect alarms, but can become proac-
tive, for example to anticipate abnormal situations and
provide guidance for a person under its care. For example,
the AmI system could be used to guide a person with
dementia back to bed during the night-time, if inappro-
priate or frequent wandering was detected by location
sensors. Context, of course, is important to ensure a
proper and sensible decision is made. However, built into
this service model, there should always be a human
backup. If the AmI system fails to achieve its objective,
then a human carer or friend can be alerted (e.g. via a call
centre), and appropriate care restored. This means we
should not design a system equivalent to Figure 5(c),
where the human ‘safety net’ is eliminated, even by stealth
or overconfidence in the system.
The sensitivity and specificity of the AmI system then is
a key quality metric. If the number of alerts to the users is
reduced then the AmI system will add value. However,
they should not be reduced to a point where external
human help is needed and not signalled by the system,
or beyond which the humans become disengaged.
As the capacity of AmI systems increases, and they
become interconnected then Web 2.0 technologies
(and beyond) may provide human contact with virtual
neighbours, and contact with other AmI systems, to
build a community feeling and thus enhance the safety
net. This of course raises many societal questions with
an ethical dimension. What information should be
shared and with whom, and will this always benefit the
individual being cared for? AmI, like other services, must
adhere to the highest ethical principles in support of the
human.
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